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Some information systems are critical to defend against malicious attack.  Yet they often rely on just the same countermeasures as any
system ? firewalls, authentication, intrusion-detection systems, and encryp!tion ? although politically motivated attackers may be far
more determined than hackers to bring them down.  Future information security will increasingly use ideas from military defensive
tactics [3] to effectively defend critical information sys !tems.  This will include automatic "counterintelligence" with deliberately
deceptive behavior, what we call "software decoys".  Decoys can deceive attackers into thinking their attacks have succeeded while
protecting key assets at least temporarily.
 
Much good work has been done on intrusion detection systems [8, 11], but only recently has there been corresponding work on how an
attacked system should respond.  Many respond to serious attacks by turning off the network connection, a high cost in today's
networked world.  Such a response tells the attacker they have been detected and this may just direct them to better targets.  Moreover,
defenders lose information about how the attack would have proceeded which they could have used to make defense more effective.
 
A cyber-attack is an attack on resources to gain tactical or strategic advantage just as in regular warfare.  Deceptive responses can be
automated much like the at!tacks.  Such responses can be very effective because attackers depend on the honesty of the computer
systems they attack.  Deception can confuse their planning or frustrate them for a while without giving away our recognition that we
are being attacked.  This could be especially important during intensive information warfare when terrorists attempt to bring down
critical systems in a short period of time: Delay permits time to analyze the attack and plan a response.  Deception also allows us to
turn an attacker's own strengths of patience and determination against them, much as Asian martial arts like Akido do with physical
strengths. 
 
The concept of a software decoy
 
We have been researching "intelligent software decoys" [9].  We use this term to cover a spectrum of deceptive defensive activity [1]. 
This can range from mimicking of normal behavior of the computer system (as when an attacker thinks they have gained system-
administrator privileges and we pretend they can modify key directories), through inventing of appealing ac!tivities for the attacker (as
when an attacker overflows a buffer and we pretend they have changed the behavior of the operating system), to new facilities (as
when an attacker gets clues to a trap site with apparently vulnerable software).  Appropriate deceptive tactics depend on the value of
the resources being protected and the danger of the attack.  But the general idea is to limit or confine [7] attacks that get through our
first line of defense rather than stop attacks.  Decoys differ from honeypots [4] in providing defense, not data.
 
Decoys are easiest to make when simple effects (like denial of service) are sought by attackers.  They will generally work best against
hands-on adversaries as opposed to automated scripts, though unpredictable responses by a decoy could well foil a script.  Effective
decoys need not be complex.  Simple ploys in warfare can be surprisingly effective when their timing is right, they are consistent with
enemy expecta!tions, and they have some creativity.
 
Decoying capabilities should be distributed through an operating system and applications programs to pro!vide a uniform front to
attackers with no single point of compromise.  They could go in Web servers, mail servers, and file-transfer utilities to address denial-
of-service attacks and attempts to jump into the operating system.  They could go in directory-listing capabilities to provide false
information about sensitive directories.  They could also go in network routers to address denial of service and suspicious patterns (like
strings of nulls) with connection errors.  More ambitious decoys could be embedded in all file-writing capabilities or all security-
related activities of the operating system, through the use of "wrapper" technology that automatically inserts checking code around
sensitive statements ("in !struments" it) [9].  While this may sound ambitious, an analogous technology exists for instrumenting code to
calculate software metrics and monitor software at runtime, and such instrumentation has been successfully accomplished for large
soft!ware systems -- it is not hard for simple open-source operating systems like those for small devices.
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We can distinguish levels of decoying. At the simplest level are memoryless decoys that respond the same way to the same local
context.  A behavior model based on an ?event grammar? can operate on the sys !tem log to detect suspicious local context.  It can use
sophisticated ideas from the field of temporal logic.  Creativity of decoy responses can be done with generative grammars having
random choices.  For instance, we have written generators for fake error messages (like "Error at 2849271: Segmentation fault") and
for fake directory listings (with fake file names, dates, sizes, and subdirectories).
 
At a higher level, a de!coy can remember other invocations of the same code.  For instance, a server can store details of other
transactions it has serviced, to recognize denial-of-service attacks.  At a further level, decoys in different software modules can share
information about an attack, as when an attacker installs their own operating system.  Finally at the highest level, a decoy can simulate
the entire operating system itself within a ?sandbox? or safe environment.  This would be helpful when Trojan horses of unknown
capabilities have been inserted into an operating system and the decoy must simulate them [2].  The higher levels of decoying require
an architecture of response management [6].
 
Types of software-decoy responses
 
A generally useful decoy tactic is exaggeration of intended attacker effects: Good deceptions should confirm preconceptions of the
deceived.  Under a denial-of-service attack, for instance, we can pretend to increase the load on a computer system by deliberately
delaying system responses.  This can be done by calculating and implementing delays, accomplished by additional process-suspension
time, into the servicing of attacker transactions [10], with perhaps additional scripted interaction with the at!tacker.
 
An important factor in this is the probability that we are under attack.  Unfortunately, new vulnerabilities and new techniques for
exploiting those vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered.  Recent hacker behavior shows an increasing automation of attacks,
in!creasing use of rootkits, decreasing use of probes, and an increasing use of encryption for network communication [4].  But a deter !-
mined adversary like a terrorist group will want to try new methods we have not anticipated.  We must then use general principles to
estimate the probability we are under attack, and respond proportionately to this probability.  We can use current intrusion-detection
methods for this, both anomaly and misuse detection, but an especially helpful clue we are investigating are reports from similar sites
about attacks that they are undergoing [5].  Automatic data mining from system logs can be helpful at those sites to analyze how they
were attacked.
 
Decoy delays can be accomplished by process-suspension time alone, but alternatives can make the decep!tion more interesting and
engaging to the attacker.  Many attackers see their activities as like playing a computer game, so some game-like behavior in the decoy
could be helpful, as could "showmanship" [1].  This could involve user interactions such as requests for authorization, requests to
confirm allocation of more system resources like memory, deliberate errors, and invocation of new scripts pretending to be system-
administrator tools ? we can get creative.
 
Responses of software decoys must necessarily vary with resources available to fight the attack.  Consider denial-of-service decoys for
transaction servers.  Delay exaggeration is only effective below a certain system load, because good deception requires that we still
process the trans !actions albeit more slowly.  If the attack intensity continues to increase, we could systematically simplify transactions,
without telling users, by ignoring less-important parts of the input.  Or we could respond to a transaction with a cached result of a
similar transaction, an effective idea for denial-of-service attacks doing the same transaction repeatedly.
 
If the attack intensity continues to grow, the system has no choice but to refuse transactions.  However, we may still fool an attacker if
we substitute a low-resource interaction that could conceivably result from a successful attack.  For in!stance, we could say ?Buffer
overflow" and start what appears to be a debugger with "Stopped at line 368802 of module serv89 -- singlestep?? Or we could claim
memory needs to be reallocated due to the high system load, and give the attacker a fake opportunity to change module memory
require!ments.  Eventually however, if attack intensity continues to increase we must turn off the network connection and terminate the
game with the attacker.
 
Attackers will eventually recognize decoys, and will plot countermeasures such as ignoring sites with recognizable decoy
"signatures."  But we can plot to counter the countermeasures, and so on.  The classic field of game theory provides methods to
analyze such situations and find our best overall strategy.
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